

**BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 71-101V2

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Special Investigations

PROTECTIVE SERVICE MATTERS



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This volume implements AFD 71-1, *Criminal Investigations and Counterintelligence*. It requires the collection and maintenance of information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974. The authority is in Title 10, United States Code, Chapters 47 and 8013. System of records notice F124 AF D, *Investigative Support Records*, applies. This instruction does not confer upon an individual any rights or privileges that applicable law does not require. See **Attachment 1** for references and terms used in this instruction.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This revision defines those specific senior Air Force officials authorized protective service support and directs AFOSI to identify individuals and billets designated as high risk, IAW DoDI 2000.16, *DoD Combating Terrorism Program Standards* and AFI 10-245, *Air Force Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program Standards* (Para 2.3.). It fully identifies responsibilities of Security Advisors and protective service details in determining protective service requirements, reporting requirements to higher headquarters, and training standards and restrictions for heavy armored vehicle (HAV) drivers (Para 2.3.1. - 2.8.3.). It identifies request and approval procedures for PSO support to Foreign Dignitaries (Para 2.9.1. - 2.9.3.) and redefines terrorist threat levels to comply with current definitions in DoDD 2000.12, *DoD Antiterrorism and Force Protection Program*.

Chapter 1

PROTECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND OTHERS

1.1. Reporting Requirements. The Department of the Air Force will report information required by Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 5030.34, *Agreement Between the United States Secret Service and the Department of Defense Concerning Protection of the President and Other Officials*, September 17, 1986, to the United States Secret Service (USSS).

1.1.1. All Air Force personnel will immediately report information affecting the security or safety of persons or facilities set forth in **Attachment 2** to the local Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) unit. When personnel possessing the information are not able to immediately establish contact with AFOSI, they must use one of the following methods to directly contact the USSS without delay:

1.1.1.1. Commercial telephone: (202) 406-5000.

1.1.1.2. Secure Telephone (STU III): (202) 406-6971.

1.1.1.3. Electrical message address: RUEHSE US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC//DC//ID//.

1.1.1.4. Follow up telephonic notification with an IMMEDIATE precedence electrical message within 24 hours. Include the local AFOSI unit as an IMMEDIATE precedence information addressee on all such messages.

1.1.2. All Air Force personnel will notify their supervisors as soon as feasible when they have reported required information to AFOSI or USSS. If the individual has not already reported the information to AFOSI or USSS, supervisors will immediately report it using guidance in paragraph **1.1.1**.

1.1.3. Commanders responsible for processing separation, retirement, or discharge of Air Force members (military, civilian, or foreign national) must ensure information required by **Attachment 3**, paragraph **A3.1.4**, is immediately furnished to USSS.

1.1.4. Directors of Base Medical Services will immediately:

1.1.4.1. Report information required by **Attachment 3**, paragraph A3.1.5 to USSS concerning persons being processed through medical channels for discharge.

1.1.4.2. Ensure persons are given a mental health evaluation prior to being administratively discharged if they have threatened one of the officials described in **Attachment 3**, if ordered by the member's commander and the order complies with the requirements of DoDD 6490.1 and AFI 44-109. See AFI 44-109, Mental Health and Military Law.

1.2. Briefing Requirements. Supervisors will brief all Air Force personnel (military, civilian, and foreign national) on the reporting requirements, as detailed in this chapter and **Attachment 3**, upon their initial entry onto active duty or employment.

1.2.1. Commanders or supervisors will brief military personnel during basic training or pre-commissioning programs.

1.2.2. Commanders will ensure that military personnel receive a briefing during the Intro Program after arriving at a permanent change of station (PCS) duty assignment.

1.2.3. Supervisors will brief civilian and foreign national employees when they report to their initial assignments. Supervisors will ensure their civilian and foreign national employees receive a briefing every 3 years.

1.2.4. Supervisors and commanders must document briefings.

1.2.5. AFOSI units will provide guidance on preparing the briefings for commanders and supervisors upon request.

Chapter 2

PROTECTIVE SERVICE PROCEDURES

2.1. Protective Services. AFOSI will provide protective services, including long-term protective service operations (PSO), when the requester and AFOSI jointly determine such protection is needed. (See **Attachment 4** for PSO considerations.)

2.1.1. The Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG) will resolve all disputes that cannot be resolved between AFOSI and requesters.

2.2. Responsibilities:

2.2.1. Air Force installation commanders will ensure the safety and security of all assigned and visiting personnel.

2.2.2. AFOSI is the lead agency within the Air Force authorized to provide specialized protective services.

2.2.3. AFOSI will:

2.2.3.1. Investigate threats against Air Force or DoD officials made by Air Force members.

2.2.3.2. Refer information about similar threats by civilians to the USSS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

2.2.3.3. Monitor any resulting investigations affecting the Air Force.

2.2.3.4. Train security forces on protective support functions.

2.2.4. The AFOSI detail leader, through the AFOSI detachment, will request the assistance of the Installation Chief of Security Forces to obtain the following on-base support for PSOs:

2.2.4.1. Traffic control.

2.2.4.2. Installation perimeter security and entry and exit control.

2.2.4.3. Checkpoints, crowd control, and surveillance security posts.

2.2.4.4. Security for principal's aircraft.

2.2.4.5. Perimeter security for principal's on-base residence.

2.2.4.6. Other support which the AFOSI detail leader and the installation Chief of Security Police agree upon.

2.3. Protection of Senior Air Force Officials . AFOSI will, as a minimum, provide a security advisor to coordinate protective services and other protective assistance for the Secretary and Undersecretary of the Air Force, the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Major Command commanders. Additionally, AFOSI will identify individuals and billets designated as high risk IAW DoDI 2000.16, "DoD Combating Terrorism Program Standards" and AFI 31-210, "The Air Force Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program Standards". These designations will be coordinated with the Air Staff Force Protection Working Group.

2.3.1. Installation commanders will not independently request protective services for these officials from their servicing AFOSI office

2.3.2. AFOSI will conduct a Protective Threat Assessment (PTA) for each stop on the itinerary to determine if these officials require protection.

2.3.3. Local commanders will not initiate protective measures for these officials without the prior approval of the AFOSI Security Advisor.

2.4. Services Provided to USAF Senior Leadership : AFOSI will provide as a minimum, a security advisor to coordinate protective services and other protective assistance as needed

2.4.1. The appropriate AFOSI Field Investigations Region (FIR) or the AFOSI 33rd Field Investigations Squadron (FIS) will coordinate PTAs with the appropriate AFOSI units, DoD protective service organizations, federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement and/or security agencies for all travel where the protectee will be off-base or overseas.

2.4.2. The AFOSI Security Advisor will coordinate protective measures for the traveling official at his or her travel destinations, where such protection is deemed appropriate.

2.4.3. The AFOSI Security Advisor will document (via memo for record) all instances where protection is offered and declined.

2.4.4. The AFOSI Security Advisor or designated Region or FIS representative will provide daily inputs to HQ AFOSI/XOO (Current Operations Division) regarding location and security arrangements for each assigned protectee.

2.5. Local Support:

2.5.1. In the local area, AFOSI will conduct a local protective threat assessment, and annual security assessments to include office and residence security assessments.

2.5.2. AFOSI will provide annual antiterrorism briefings; specifically addressing personal and family security, travel security, driving security, and hostage survival.

2.6. CONUS Travel :

2.6.1. AFOSI will conduct a PTA for each stop and route of travel on the protectee's itinerary to determine whether other official requires protection.

2.6.2. Based upon results of the PTA, AFOSI and the protectee or his/her designated representative will jointly determine the level of security required.

2.6.3. Actual protective services provided will range from supplying the protectee's staff with a point of contact list for the area to be visited, to assigning a PSO trained AFOSI Security Advisor to travel with the protectee. On rare occasions, a protective detail may be required depending upon the event, location and threat.

2.7. OCONUS Travel:

2.7.1. AFOSI will coordinate a PTA for each stop and route of travel on the protectee's itinerary to determine whether the official requires protection.

2.7.2. Based upon results of the PTA, AFOSI and the protectee or his/her designated representative will jointly determine the level of security required.

2.7.3. Unless the protectee is to remain on a United States military base, a Security Advisor or protective detail will be used depending upon the event, location and threat.

2.8. Other Services:

2.8.1. AFOSI will establish training standards and ensure training is accomplished for personnel assigned as drivers for USAF senior leaders.

2.8.2. AFOSI will coordinate driver participation in the Threat Response Driving Seminar (TRDS).

2.8.3. Security Advisors will document all instances where drivers assigned to senior USAF leaders decline attendance in the TRDS.

2.9. Protective Services for Foreign Guests of HQ USAF and the DoD:

2.9.1. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Foreign Liaison, will notify the appropriate AFOSI Field Investigations Region (FIR) or the AFOSI 33rd Field Investigative Squadron (FIS) and HQ AFOSI/XOQS (Functional Services Branch), of pending visits by foreign guests of OSD, which require PSO coverage. The appropriate AFOSI FIR or the AFOSI 33rd FIS will then coordinate a PTA as required for all such visits.

2.9.2. The Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, International Affairs Division (HQ USAF/CVAI), will notify HQ AFOSI/XOQS, and the appropriate AFOSI FIR or the AFOSI 33rd FIS of pending visits by foreign guests of HQ USAF, which may require PSO coverage. The appropriate AFOSI FIR or 33rd FIS will coordinate a PTA as required for all such visits.

2.9.3. Based upon the results of the PTA, AFOSI and the tasking office (OSD or HQ USAF/CVAI) will jointly determine if a PSO is in the best interest of the Air Force and DoD. If so, AFOSI 33rd FIS, Andrews AFB, MD, will coordinate with HQ AFOSI/XOQS, AFOSI/XOO (Current Operations Division), and any other affected AFOSI offices, concerning the security requirements for the visiting dignitary.

2.10. Protective Assistance to Other DoD Agencies:

2.10.1. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Personal Security) determines the level of protection afforded to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Deputy SECDEF, and may task military departments for necessary assistance in providing this protection.

2.10.2. The Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) determines which military department will provide protection for the CJCS.

2.10.3. Air Force personnel who learn of a specific threat against the CJCS will immediately notify the local AFOSI unit.

2.10.4. AFOSI will notify the Executive Assistant to the CJCS.

2.10.5. AFOSI will maintain liaison with the other DoD protective service organizations and, when resources permit, provide assistance to them when their principals visit US Air Force bases or areas where AFOSI has primary jurisdiction.

2.11. Support to State and Local Agencies. When necessary, and when resources permit, AFOSI will assist state and local agencies in protecting officials or dignitaries visiting a US Air Force installation or activity.

2.12. Protection of Victims and Witnesses:

2.12.1. AFOSI will refer to AFI 51-201, Administration of Military Justice, concerning their responsibility for the protection of victims and witnesses.

2.12.2. Commanders will request an AFOSI PSO for victims and witnesses only in extraordinary cases where specialized protective measures are required, and when there are specific threats against those individuals.

Chapter 3

ARMORED VEHICLE PROGRAM

3.1. Responsibilities:

3.1.1. Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG) will:

3.1.1.1. Submit a nontactical armored vehicle (AV) report via the Directorate of Special Investigations (SAF/IGX) to the Assistant SECDEF (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) (Counter-terror-ism) (ASD (SO/LIC) (CT)) and Defense Intelligence Agency/Counterintelligence Division (DIA/ OS-ID) not later than 1 March each year.

3.1.1.2. Exercise oversight responsibility for all special vehicle acquisitions needed to combat the terrorist threat via SAF/IGX.

3.1.1.3. Review and approve command supplements to this instruction via SAF/IGX.

3.1.2. Major commands (MAJCOM) and field operating agencies (FOA) will:

3.1.2.1. Establish a focal point for command-assigned AVs.

3.1.2.2. Submit an annual report (per AFCA/ICB) to SAF/IGX to arrive not later than 15 February each year detailing any procurement, costs, and deployments of command nontactical light armored vehicles (LAV) during the previous calendar year in accordance with DIA/OS-ID format.

3.1.2.3. Submit special vehicle requests in response to terrorist threats to SAF/IGX for validation before being sent to the Directorate of Transportation (HQ USAF/LGT).

3.1.2.4. Fund transportation costs incurred as a result of command initiated transfers, reallocations, or deployments of AVs.

3.1.2.5. Fund maintenance and repair of AVs.

3.1.3. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) will:

3.1.3.1. Manage the Air Force heavy armored vehicle (HAV) fleet to obtain the greatest flexibility in protecting all high-risk personnel.

3.1.3.2. Allocate Air Force HAVs subject to the concurrence of the regional unified commanders or their designated security elements.

3.1.3.3. Submit an annual report (delete this reference per AFCA/ICB) to SAF/IGX to arrive not later than 15 February each year detailing any procurement costs and deployments of AFOSI-managed HAVs during the previous calendar year according to DIA/OS-ID format.

3.1.3.4. Coordinate tactical deployments of AVs with supported commands.

3.1.3.5. Determine when to use an AV to protect high-risk personnel by considering the factors in [Attachment 4](#), paragraph [A4.3](#). and the possibility of using an LAV instead of an HAV.

3.1.3.6. Establish agreements with the supported commands to ensure continuity of support.

3.1.3.7. Evaluate AVs and protective systems.

3.1.3.8. Provide or certify specialized antiterrorism defensive and evasive driver courses (e.g. the Senior Officer Security Seminar, the Threat Response Driving Seminar (TRDS), AFOSI PSO

course, or other training provided by a certified driving instructor). NOTE: Driving of HAVs is restricted to authorized individuals trained in defensive and evasive driving techniques. Authorized individuals include, but are not limited to: military member or person occupying high-risk billets (does not include any dependents), Security Forces, AFOSI special agents, Transportation Squadron personnel and foreign nationals assigned as drivers for individuals in high-risk billets. Other individuals may be authorized (in writing) on a case-by-case basis depending on specific circumstances surrounding the use of the HAV in their respective area of responsibility. All drivers must have successfully completed specialized antiterrorism defensive and evasive driver training.

3.1.3.9. Prepare current threat assessments to accompany installation commanders' requests for vehicle requirements resulting from terrorist threats.

3.1.3.10. Provide hands-on orientation to drivers and maintenance personnel on the operation and special care required for AVs.

3.1.3.11. Establish a focal point for command assigned AVs.

3.2. AV Logistics and Alternate Considerations:

3.2.1. Procurement of HAVs will be handled according to DoD Directive C-4500.51, *DoD Nontactical Armored Vehicle Policy*, May 4, 1987.

3.2.2. When warranted by the local threat, achieve transportation security objectives through selective use of LAVs, unarmored indigenous vehicles, vehicle painting and marking exemptions, and domicile-to-duty transportation. Refer to AFI 24-301, *Vehicle Operations*.

3.2.3. HAV drivers will not exceed the armoring firm's recommended top speed, as armoring adds significantly to a vehicle's weight and required stopping distance.

3.2.4. Due to the sensitivity of nontactical AV transparent armor to interior heat build-up, direct sunlight, and ultraviolet light, garage AVs whenever practical. As a minimum, place them under cover, such as a carport, to prevent long-term damage. Prolonged exposure causes delamination and loss of the rated ballistic defeat capabilities of the transparent armor.

3.2.5. Upon determining an AV is unserviceable, Air Force elements will:

3.2.5.1. Send a message to Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC ROBINS AFB GA//LVDV//) with information copies to SAF/IGX and HQ AFOSI/Logistics and Engineering (HQ AFOSI/LG) requesting vehicle disposition instructions.

3.2.5.2. Salvage subject vehicle according to AFMAN 23-110, USAF Supply Manual.

3.2.5.3. Remove all transparent armor and opaque armoring materials from LAVs prior to turning them in for disposal.

RAYMOND P. HUOT, Lt General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

DoD Directive C-4500.51, *DoD Non-Tactical Armored Vehicle Policy*, May 4, 1987

DoD Instruction 5030.34, *Agreement Between the United States Secret Service and the Department of Defense Concerning Protection of the President and Other Services*, September 17, 1986

DoDI 2000.16, *DoD Combating Terrorism Program Standards, 14 June 2001*. Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056

Title 3, United States Code, Section 202

Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "*DoD Armored Car Policy (U)*", April 25, 1984

Public Law 87-195, "*Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*", September 4, 1961

AFMAN 23-110, *USAF Supply Manual*

AFI 24-301, *Vehicle Operations*

AFI 44-109, *Mental Health and Military Law*

AFI 10-245, *The Air Force Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program Standards, 1 August 1999*.

AFI 51-201, *Military Justice Guide, Administration of Military Justice*

Terms

Detail Leader—A special agent, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), assigned overall responsibility for the personal safety and security of a principal during a protective service operation (PSO). The detail leader is authorized to make decisions on all matters concerning the immediate personal safety and security of the principal.

Distinguished Visitor (DV)—A guest of the US Air Force or DoD who, by virtue of rank or position, receives honors or protocol.

Fully Armored Vehicles—These vehicles are referred to as nontactical heavy armored vehicles (HAV). HAVs are commercially designed and manufactured, fully armored configured, motor vehicles procured especially to provide security protection to certain key DoD officials or visiting dignitaries.

High-Risk DoD Personnel—US personnel and their family members whose grade, assignment, travel itinerary, or symbolic value may make them an especially attractive or accessible terrorist target.

Partially Armored Vehicles—These motor vehicles are referred to as nontactical light armored vehicles (LAV). MAJCOMs obtain standard vehicles through normal procurement channels to fulfill valid transportation requirements and later alter them by affixing armoring materials to the windows and body areas.

Primary Agency—A law enforcement, security, or investigative agency with overall responsibility (as established by law or directive) for providing protective services for a principal.

Principal—Another name for the protectee of a protective service operation. A principal may or may not

be a distinguished visitor (DV).

Protective Service—A specialized activity, which increases the personal safety and security of a distinguished visitor or other principal. The activity may be limited to a protective threat assessment or may extend to a major PSO involving considerable manpower and resources.

Protective Service Operation (PSO)—The use of specialized techniques and procedures by trained personnel to ensure a principal's personal safety and security during a specific event, while traveling, or over an extended period of time. When required, a PSO can be tailored to provide 24-hour protection. In such cases, the security detail establishes defensive overt or clandestine perimeters around the principal for the term of the PSO at the residence, during travel, and at all sites on the principal's daily itinerary.

PSO-Long Term—Any PSO which lasts longer than 30 days and does not have a known termination date. Usually, AFOSI conducts such operations to protect against a specific threat or vulnerability when the principal cannot be relocated.

Protective Threat Assessment (PTA)—Collecting and analyzing information to identify direct and potential threats to harm, seize, interfere with, or embarrass a specific principal, as well as to determine the existing and anticipated security environment. A PTA is always the initial phase of a PSO.

- Terrorist Threat Levels – Terrorist threat levels are derived as a result of analyzing the operational capability, intent, activity and operating environment of terrorist groups or individuals.
 - High—Anti-U.S. terrorist group is operationally active and uses large casualty producing attacks as their preferred method of operation. There is a substantial DoD presence and the operating environment favors the terrorist.
 - Significant—Anti-U.S. terrorist is operationally active and attack personnel as their preferred method of operation or a group uses large casualty producing attacks as their preferred method and has limited operational activity. The operating environment is neutral.
 - Moderate—Terrorist groups are present but there is no indication of anti-U.S. activity. The operating environment favors the Host Nation/U.S.
 - Low—No terrorist group is detected or the group activity is non-threatening.

Attachment 2**PERSONNEL AND PLACES THE USSS PROTECTS**

A2.1. Subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, the United States Secret Service (USSS) has authority to protect:

A2.1.1. The President, the Vice President (or other officer next in the order of succession to the Office of President), the President-elect, and the Vice President-elect.

A2.1.2. The immediate families of those individuals listed above.

A2.1.3. Former Presidents and their spouses for their lifetimes. The protection of a spouse will terminate in the event of remarriage.

A2.1.4. Children of a former President who are under 16 years of age.

A2.1.5. Visiting heads of foreign states or foreign governments.

A2.1.6. Other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad when the President directs such protection be provided.

A2.1.7. Major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates and, within 120 days of the general Presidential election, the spouses of such candidates.

A2.1.8. Other persons who the USSS identifies to the DoD.

A2.1.9. The White House.

A2.1.10. Any building housing Presidential offices.

A2.1.11. The Vice President's official residence.

A2.1.12. Foreign diplomatic missions in any area of the United States, its territories, or possessions as directed by the USSS.

Attachment 3**INFORMATION REPORTABLE TO THE USSS**

A3.1. Reportable Information. Reportable information exchanged between the Air Force and the USSS includes all information, no matter how innocent, about immediate and present dangers or past incidents affecting the security of any person or facility under the protection of the USSS. This information can be a threat, plan, or attempt to physically harm or kidnap the President, Vice President, their family members, or other high government officials such as foreign heads of state, governors, mayors, members of the Congress, Supreme Court justices, or ambassadors.

A3.1.1. Identification data. To the extent available, the name or names of an individual or group, including former legal names, aliases, and pseudonyms; address; photograph; physical description; date and place of birth; employment; marital status; and identifying military service numbers; as applicable.

A3.1.2. Record data. Files, summaries, or excerpts from DoD files of information concerning an individual or group reportable under provisions of DoD Instruction 5030.34.

A3.1.3. Information pertaining to:

A3.1.3.1. Threats, incidents, or demonstrations against foreign diplomatic missions (embassies, chanceries, consulates) in the United States or its territories.

A3.1.3.2. The use or attempted use of bodily harm, assassination, or kidnapping as a political weapon (including training and techniques used to carry out the act).

A3.1.3.3. Persons who insist upon personally contacting high government officials for redress of grievances and whose actions demonstrate a mental and emotional instability.

A3.1.3.4. Terrorists and their individual and group activities.

A3.1.3.5. The ownership or concealment, by individuals or groups, of caches of firearms, explosives, or other paramilitary or military equipment when it is believed the intended use is for other than legal purposes.

A3.1.3.6. Civil disturbances which may require the use of federalized National Guard or US military personnel to maintain or restore public order.

A3.1.4. DoDI 5030.34 requires reporting of information pertaining to US citizens or residents who have renounced or indicated a desire to renounce the US Government and who are characterized by:

A3.1.4.1. Violent, irrational, or suicidal behavior or other emotional instability.

A3.1.4.2. Violent anti-United States sentiment.

A3.1.4.3. A propensity toward violence.

A3.1.4.4. Persons within the DoD or those who are being separated, discharged, or retired from the Armed Forces or from civilian employment in the DoD, and whose competent authority (installation or hospital commanders) deems to constitute a threat to the safety of the President or the Vice President of the United States, or other persons protected by the USSS..

Attachment 4

PSO CONSIDERATIONS

A4.1. Responsibilities. The Air Force will protect its leaders and official guests from acts which jeopardize their safety and security or impede their mission.

A4.1.1. The US Government holds host foreign governments responsible for the safety of US citizens overseas. The US Air Force may provide protective services off base in overseas areas only under circumstances that conform to local Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), treaties, agreements, or laws.

A4.1.2. AFOSI is the focal point for all liaison activity with the USSS, the Department of State Office of Security (DOS/SY), and all other federal, state, and local agencies regarding protective service missions.

A4.2. Protecting Others:

A4.2.1. AFOSI will protect family members of an AFOSI protective services principal when accompanied by the principal. AFOSI will protect family members who are not accompanied by the principal only when AFOSI and the requester jointly determine that such protection is necessary.

A4.2.2. AFOSI will not provide support or services for non-Air Force or non-DoD related principals in an off-base environment without specific approval from the Executive Secretary of the DoD or the Deputy Executive Secretary of the DoD.

A4.3. Requesting Protective Services. Request AFOSI protective services only in the following situations:

A4.3.1. There is a clear and direct threat to a specific individual.

A4.3.2. An Air Force leader or official guest must perform a mission in an environment which places that person at significant and abnormal risk, in other than a wartime situation.

A4.3.3. In war zones, AFOSI PSOs will be initiated only for noncombatant Air Force officials required to be there temporarily for fact-finding or other essential reasons. Other senior military officials will be protected only if specifically requested or directed by the Theater Commander.

A4.4. Advisors. AFOSI and installation Chiefs of Security Police serve as key advisors to commanders in determining reasonable protective measures.

A4.5. Authority. Final authority rests with the AFOSI PSO Detail Leader to make all decisions affecting the safety and security of the principal and AFOSI protective service personnel.